Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00948 01 OF 02 202155Z

64

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 INT-05 /066 W

----- 118623

R 201800Z FEB 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 215
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0948

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: NAC MEETING FEB 19 - AGENDA ITEM II

REFS: A. USNATO 0179; B. STATE 035747

SUMMARY: SYG LUNS OPENED DISCUSSION ON THE MACHINERY FOR POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS BY STATING THAT HE OPPOSED THE NEW PROCEDURES AND BELIEVED THAT THE PRODUCTION OF ASSESSMENTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS SHOULD BE HANDLED BY EXISTING NATO COMMITTEES. MOST OF THE PERMREPS AGREED THAT THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES, ALTHOUGH CUMBERSOME, DESERVED TESTING. THE COUNCIL APPROVED THE PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN C-M(74)52 ON A TEMPORARY BASIS PENDING FURTHER EVALUATION DURING EXERCISE HILEX 7. END SUMMARY:

1. SYG LUNS OPENED DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT PREPARED BY THE COUNCIL OPERATIONS EXERCISE COMMITTEE (COEC) ON THE ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND TENSION (C-M(74)52) BY STATING THAT HIS VIEWS ON THIS DOCUMENT REMAIN AS EXPRESSED AT THE JAN 14 PERMREP LUNCHEON (REF A REFERS). IN HIS VIEW, THE PRODUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 00948 01 OF 02 202155Z

POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS OR TENSION BY NATO HQ IS A DIFFICULT TASK BECAUSE OF THE RAPID PACE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE USUAL LACK OF TIMELY NATIONAL INPUTS. SYG SAID THAT HE AND SOME OF HIS TOP STAFF (ASYG KASTL) OPPOSE

THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF NEW MACHINERY AND BELIEVE THAT

THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS SHOULD BE HANDLED BY EXISTING NATO COMMITTEES

- 2. SIR PETER HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN MC) SAID THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD WELCOME THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION (C-M(74)52). HE MAINTAINED THAT THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR DEMONSTRATED THE INADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING MACHINERY TO PRODUCE AN OVERALL POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT REQUESTED BY SACEUR. HE SAID THAT FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW TIMELY POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS ARE REQUIRED DURING A PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION OR CRISIS TO GUIDE THE ACTIONS OF THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS. HE SAID THAT THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED SUCH GUIDANCE FROM NATO HQ AND THE FORMATION OF THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP WOULD BE ONE STEP TOWARDS MEETING THIS ESSENTIAL MILITARY REQUIREMENT.
- 3. AMB PECK (UK) SAID THAT HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS WERE IMPORTANT AND REQUIRED. ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PROPOSALS IN C-M(74)52 ARE SIMILAR TO AN "INTRICATE PIECE OF MACHINERY", HE FELT THAT THEY ARE NECESSARY AND SHOULD BE EVALUATED DURING HILEX 7.
- 4. AMB SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT YET PREPARED TO SET UP THESE GROUPS ON A PERMANENT BASIS BUT HAD AGREED TO THE FORMATION OF A CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP AND A CURRENT OPERATIONAL GROUP ON A TMPORARY BASIS PENDING EVALUATION DURING A NATO HQ EXERCISE.
- 5. AMB HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES ARE DEVELOPED ON A TRIAL AND ERROR BASIS AND HE RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF THE DOCUMENT WITH THE PROVISO THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES BE REVIEWED AFTER HILEX 7. IN REF TO PARA 14, HE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HOPED THAT THIS CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE THAT ASSESSMENTS WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 00948 01 OF 02 202155Z

PASS THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE PRIOR TO PRESENTATION TO THE NAC/DPC.

6. AMB HARTOGH SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP WOULD IN MOST CASES BYPASS THE VARIOUS SENIOR COMMITTEES WHERE ALLIED GOVTS ARE REPRESENTED BECAUSE OF THE CLAUSE "IN SITUATIONS WHERE TIME WOULD PERMIT". AMB CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THAT HE SHARED THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY HIS COLLEAGUES. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE FORMATION OF A SMALL HIGH-LEVEL GROUP TO ASSIMILATE NATIONAL INPUTS WAS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE NAC/DPC. CATALANO SAID THAT HE WAS PERPLEXED ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLOW FOR PARTICIPATION BY ALLIED DELEGATIONS. HE WENT ON TO SAY

THAT HE HOPED THAT THESE NEW PROCEDURES WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL AND EXERCISED DURING HILEX 7.

- 7. COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN (MACBRIEN) SAID THAT AN OPEN-ENDED CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP WAS CONSIDERED BUT WAS DISCARDED BECAUSE ANY ASSESSMENT OF VALUE MUST BE PRODUCED QUICKLY.
- 8. AMB ERALP (TURKEY) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT ENTHUS-IASTIC ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP BECAUSE IT MIGHT EXERCISE TOO GRETAT AN INFLUENCE IN NATO.
- 9. AMB DE STAERCKE (GELGIUM) SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN C-M(74)52 PROVIDE THE MECHANISM FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS. IN HIS VIEW, THE MAJOR QUESTION IS TESTING THE VALIDITY AND EFFICACY OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURES.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 00948 02 OF 02 202200Z

64

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 INT-05 /066 W

----- 118719

R 201800Z FEB 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 216
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 0948

10. AMB DE ROSE (FRANCE) EMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT FRANCE DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN NATO HQ EXERCISES AND THERFORE IT IS DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO EVALUATE THE REQUIREMENT ESTABLISHED AFTER HILEX 5 FOR POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE EXISTING SENIOR NATO COMMITTEES ARE ALREADY RESPONSIBLE FOR PERFORMING CERTAIN FUNCTIONS DURING PERIODS OF INT'L TENSION OR CRISIS AND HE WONDERED WHAT IMPACT THE FORMATION OF TWO NEW GROUPS WOULD HAVE ON THESE EXISTING COMMITTEES. AMB DE ROSE SAID THAT HE WOULD FIND IT MOST HELPFUL IF AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WERE PRODUCED DEPICTING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE EXISTING NATO COMMITTEES AND THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL GROUP/CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP/CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

11. COEC CHAIRMAN MACBRIEN SAID THAT AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WOULD BE INCLUDED WHEN COEC DRAFTED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL GROUP AND THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP.

12. ASYG KASTL OBSERVED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL SEEMED TO FAVOR EVALUATING THESE NEW PROCEDURES IN AN EXERCISE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE A PERSONNEL PROBLEM IN MANNING THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP AND THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL GROUP. IN HIS VIEW, THE PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIES WAS THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ONE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 00948 02 OF 02 202200Z

PRINCIPAL DRAFTER TO PRODUCE A POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT DURING TIMES OF CRISIS. HE RECALLED THAT DURING THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR HE SPENT FOUR DAYS DRAFTING A POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT WHICH NEVER REACHED NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. ASYG KASTL EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ANY NEW PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD PRODUCE A DIFFERENT RESULT.

13. AMB BUSCH (NORWAY) SAID THAT HE SHARED SOME OF THE DOUBTS EXPRESSED BY ASYG KASTL. IN HIS VIEW, ASSESSMENTS MUST REMAIN A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE PRODUCTION OF NATO HQ POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS REQUIRES CLOSE SCRUTINY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PERHAPS THE WORD "ASSESSMENT" WAS MISLEADING AND SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTING THE WORD "INFORMATION",

14. SYG LUNS SAID THAT "THE GRAVER THE CRISIS, THE MORE IT IS LIKELY THAT ASSESSMENTS WILL BE PRODUCED BY MINISTERS". HE CONCLUDED DISCUSSION ON THE ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENTS IN TIMES OF TENSION OR CRISIS BY STATING THAT THESE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE GIVEN A TRIAL RUN. THE COUNCIL AGREED. BRUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999 Channel Indicators: n/a

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Concepts: n/a Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 20 FEB 1975 Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960 Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO00948

Document Number: 1975NATO00948
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00

Drafter: n/a

Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: 11652 GDS

Errors: n/a Film Number: n/a From: NATO

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path:

Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrziim.tel Line Count: 198 Locator: TEXT ON-LINE

Office: n/a

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Original Handling Restrictions: n/a Original Previous Classification: n/a Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 4

Previous Channel Indicators:

Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 0179; B. STATE 035747
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX

Review Comment: n/a Review Content Flags: Review Date: 25 APR 2003

Review Event:

Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 APR 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <23 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>

Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JÚL 2006

Review Media Identifier: Review Referrals: n/a Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: NAC MEETING FEB 19 - AGENDA ITEM II TAGS: PFOR, NATO To: STATE

SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2000	5